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WITHDRAWING OR WITHHOLDING MEDICAL CARE
FROM PREMATURE INFANTS: WHO SHOULD
DECIDE, AND HOW?
I. INTRODUCTION
A young woman arrives at a hospital in labor.' She is at approxi-
mately twenty-six weeks gestation.2 She is poor and has had no prenatal
care.3 She has a history of cocaine use.4 The infant is born weighing less
than 750 grams.5 A neonatologist takes over.6 She wonders if the infant
is viable.7 The child has difficulty breathing, and his heart rate is too fast."
The doctor is not optimistic, but she wants to give the infant a chance.
She inserts a breathing tube in the infant's airway and begins artificial
ventilation. The infant is transported to a tertiary care facility and admit-
1. This case is hypothetical.
2. Premature births are those occurring before 37 weeks gestation. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1585 (17th ed. 1993). The normal human gestation period is 40 weeks. Id.
3. Poverty and lack of prenatal care are risk factors for premature delivery. RASA GusTArns &
ERNLE W.D. YOUNC, A TIME TO BE BORN, A TIME TO DIE 41 (1986).
4. Cocaine abuse is associated with premature delivery. William W. Hurd et al., Cocaine
selectively inhibits beta-adrenergic receptor binding in pregnant human myometrium, 169 AM.J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 644, 648 (1993). Other risk factors related to the mother include
smoking, young age, manual labor, and emotional stress. GuSTAITIS & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 41.
5. Infants weighing less than 2500 grams at birth are classified as low birth weight infants.
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1585 (17th ed. 1993). This benchmark is accepted as
the clinical indicator of prematurity, although the low birth weight category includes infants who are
not premature. Id. Infants weighing less than 1000 grams are classified as extremely-low-birth-
weight [hereinafter ELBW] infants, with gestational ages usually ranging from 22 weeks to 28 weeks.
Richard M. Cowett, Introduction, in THE MICROPREMIE: THE NEXr FRONTIER, REPORT OF THE
NINETY-NINTH Ross CONFERENCE ON PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 1 (Richard M. Cowett & William W.
Hay, Jr. eds., 1989).
6. A neonatologist is a physician specializing in neonatology, "[tihe medical study of the first 60
days of an infant's life." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 472 (1984).
7. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing the physician's difficulty in assessing
a premature infant's viability).
8. These are signs of respiratory distress syndrome, a frequent problem among very premature
infants. GusTAms & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 50. The authors compare a normal birth and a
premature birth, explaining the premature infant's inability to breathe independently:
Until [birth], oxygen has come through the placenta.... A fetal artery called the ductus
arteriosus allowed most of the flow to bypass the lungs, which were still developing ....
Normally, labor prepares the baby to start breathing.... As the baby emerges, air rushes
in with the first breath, filling the alveoli, the tiny air sacs in the lungs. The blood vessels
of the lungs expand and suddenly become the route of least resistance for the blood. A
coating, called a surfactant, appears in the lungs, preventing their total collapse during
exhalation....
The heart adapts to the new circulation pattern. The ductus arteriosus closes.
... But premature infants are not yet ready for this awesome process. For them the
stresses that would later have been beneficial are harsh and dangerous. Contractions may
asphyxiate these babies. The alveoli, lacking the surfactant, tend to collapse during
exhalation and are then held shut by surface tension. Each breath becomes harder ....
The failure of the lungs to stay expanded allows the carbon dioxide-laden blood to
continue flowing through the fetal ductus arteriosus and from there through the baby's
body. This means that the infant gets too little oxygen-he gasps, his chest heaves and
retracts, the heart beats too fast.
Id. at 49-50.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:129
ted to a neonatal intensive care unit [hereinafter NICU], where he is
placed on a respirator. °
Six weeks later, the infant remains in the NICU. Because he is still
dependant on the respirator, he has developed a chronic lung disease. 10
A heart defect related to prematurity has failed to correct itself, which has
exacerbated the lung problem."' The infant also exhibits signs of consid-
erable brain damage due to his prematurity.'2 In addition, he has devel-
oped a severe bowel infection common among premature infants. 3
The infant's prognosis is uncertain. 14 Surgery will be necessary to
assess the damage to his digestive tract.' 5 Dead bowel tissue must be
removed, and if too much is removed for the infant to digest food, he will
never be able to eat orally and will die within a few years.' 6 In addition,
he may live with severe neurosensory handicaps due to brain damage. 7
9. Tertiary care is "[a] level of medical care ... available only in large . . . institutions. [It]
includefs] ... techniques and methods of therapy and diagnosis involving equipment and personnel
that would not be economically feasible to have in a smaller institution because of the lack of
utilization." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1966 (17th ed. 1993). A respirator is "[a]
machine for prolonged artificial respiration." Id. at 1703.
10. This disease is called bronchopulmonary dysplasia. See GUSTArrIs & YOUNG supra note 3, at
38 (explaining that with bronchopulmonary dysplasia, the lung tissue [becomes] scarred, impeding
the passage of air and interfering with the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide"); see also Richard
J. Martin, Chronic Lung Disease in the Extremely-Low-Birth-Weight Infant: Is It Avoidable?, in THE
MICROPREMIE: THE NEXT FRONTIER, REPORT OF THE NINETY-NINTH Ross CONFERENCE ON
PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 36 (Richard M. Cowett & William W. Hay, Jr. eds., 1989) (discussing causal
factors of bronchopulmonary dysplasia).
11. This refers to the problem of a persistent patent (open) ductus arteriosus. See supra note 8;
Robert B. Cotton, Persistent Patent Ductus Arteriosus in the Extremely-Law-Birth-Weight Infant in
THE MICROPREMIE: THE NEXT FRONTIER, REPORT OF THE NINETY-NINTH Ross CONFERENCE ON
PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 44 (Richard M. Cowett & William W. Hay, Jr. eds., 1989).
12. Brain damage may be caused by asphyxia before or during birth. See supra note 8 (referring
to asphyxia due to contractions). Asphyxia results in an insufficient supply of oxygen to the brain. See
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 160 (17th ed. 1993). Brain damage also may be caused
by a moderate or severe hemorrhage of the immature blood vessels in the brain and a resulting fluid
buildup known as hydrocephalus. See Lu-Ann Papile, Periventricular-Intraventricular Hemorrhage
in the Extemely-Low-Birth-Weight Infant, in THE MICROPREMIE: THE NEXT FRONTIER, REPORT
OF THE Ross CONFERENCE ON PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 145, 146-47 (Richard M. Cowett & William W.
Hay, Jr. eds., 1989) (explaining that infants with birth weights under 1000 grams are more likely to
have moderate (Grade III) or severe (Grade IV) hemorrhages and that "[plosthemorrhagic
h droce halus develops in approximately 50% of ELBW infants who have a moderate or severe
hemorrhage]").
13. This infection, called necrotizing enterocolitis, can cause parts of the bowel tissue to die.
FRED M. FROHOCK, SPECIAL CARE: MEDICAL DECISIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF LIFE 42 (1986).
While the exact cause of this disorder is unknown, prematurity is the greatest risk factor. Robert M.
Kliegman, Necrotizing Enterocolitis: A Consequence of Enteral Feeding, in THE MICROPREMIE: THE
NEXT FRONTIER, REPORT OF THE NINETY-NINTH Ross CONFERENCE ON PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 122,
123 (Richard M. Cowett & William W. Hay, Jr. eds., 1989).
14. See David K. Stevenson et al., The 'Baby Doe' Rule, 255 JAMA 1909, 1911 (1986)
(describing the uncertainty of diagnosis and treatment decisions for premature infants).
15. FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 42-43.
16. Id.
17. See Maureen Hack, Follow-Up of Extremely-Low-Birth-Weight Infants, in THE
MICROPREMIE: THE NEXr FRONTIER, REPORT OF THE NINETY-NiNTH Ross CONFERENCE ON
PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 154, 159 (Richard M. Cowett & William W. Hay, Jr. eds., 1989) (stating that up
to one third of infants with birth weights under 750 grams "have moderate to severe neurosensory
handicaps- two years later).
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He may remain hospitalized and dependent on life-support machines for
the rest of his life.'" Or, he may die very soon as a result of the bowel
condition,' 9 the severe brain damage,' 0 or the lung disease.2 ' Meanwhile,
he is isolated, dependent on machines for his basic functions, and regu-
larly subjected to invasive procedures which may cause him pain.2 ' His
mother has decided that she wants aggressive medical treatment to be
withdrawn and resuscitative measures to be withheld. What now? This
hypothetical case illustrates some of the medical difficulties encountered
with premature infants and some of the reasons that medical decision-
making in such cases is difficult.
The care of very premature infants has become one the major fron-
tiers of medicine.23 By the 1920s, physicians realized that the birth pro-
cess merited medical attention,24 and hospital births gradually became
standard.' The problems of premature births received little attention,
however, until the 1960s.26 During and after that decade, breakthroughs
came about in ventilation and nutrition for premature infants, NICUs
multiplied, and many more doctors specialized in neonatal practice and
research.27 In recent years, slightly less than two percent of all births in
the United States have been very premature (under 32 weeks gestation).
28
"Prematurity is the leading cause of death in the neonatal period" and
18. See FROHOCK, snpra note 13, at 37.
19. See Kliegman, supra note 13, at 123 (stating that infants with birth weights under 750 grams
have a mortality of 40% to 65% from this disorder).
20. See Papile, supra note 12, at 146 (stating that infants with birth weights under 1000 grams
have an approximate mortality rate of 40% from intraventricular hemorrhage); see id. at 153-54
(indicating that the mortality rate is very high for infants under 1000 grams with Grade IV
hemorrhages and hydrocephaus).
21. See Maureen Hack and Avroy A. Fanaroff, Changes in the Deliversj Room Care of the
Extremely Small Infant (<750 g), 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 660, 662-63 (1986) (indicating that death
may result from immature lung development or from complications of respiratory distress syndrome).
22. See Allen F. Fischer and David K. Stevenson, The Consequences of Uncertainty: An
Empirical Approach to Medical Decision Making in Neonatal Intensive Care, 258 JAMA 1929, 1929
(1987) ("In any setting other than an intensive care unit, a daily routine that involved restraining
neonates in bed, placing plastic tubes (endotracheal and gavage) into various body orifices, and
pricking the feet with needles (phlebotomy) would be considered torture."); K.J.S. Anand and P.R.
Hickey, Pain and Its Effects in the Human Neonate and Fetus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1321, 1326
(1987) (stating that premature newborns respond to painful stimuli by means of physiologic and
behavior changes).
23. E.g., Cowett, supra note 5, at 1.
24. GusTArrIs & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 30.
25. Id. at 31.
26. Id. at 32. Several events fueled this increased interest in premature newborns. These
events included the death of President and Mrs. Kennedy's premature baby, the provision of research
funding by the March of Dimes, the beginning of Medicare funding, and the movement to lower the
United States' high infant mortality rate. Id. at 32-34.
27. Id. at 36-37.
28. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATIsTIcs, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1988, VOL. 1, NATALITY 261 (1990) (giving national statistics).
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complications related to prematurity "vary in direct proportion to the
degree of immaturity present."29
Ethical dilemmas in the treatment of these infants are first con-
fronted at the time of delivery because "no clear guidelines dictate the
initial delivery room care of the extremely immature infant (<750 g)."'3
The physician must decide whether, and how aggressively, to treat the
infant. This decision is complicated by the immediacy of the situation and
by the presence of other persons under stress.3 ' It is further complicated
by the difficult assessment of whether or not the infant is viable.32 In
practice, more and more doctors are initially providing aggressive treat-
ment in all but the worst cases.33 While doctors do not want to begin
treatment that will prove futile, they are even more wary of a delay in
treatment that will harm an infant who does survive.-" Because of the
enormous uncertainty about prognosis at delivery, doctors also want to
buy time with which to gather more information."5
For the parents and doctors of premature infants who survive but do
not improve, uncertainty may be prolonged considerably.36 The situation
is further complicated by the fact that the very treatments which such
29. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1585-86 (17th ed. 1993). Mortality for infants
with birth weights under 2500 grams is 17 times higher than for infants weighing more than 2500
grams at birth. Id. at 1585. In addition, very premature infants are likely to be the largest group of
patients in an NICU at any given time because they stay there so long. Cowett, supra note 5, at 1.
30. Hack & Faranoff, supra note 21, at 660.
31. See FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 63 (quoting a physician: "The decision, in order for it to be
a good one, has to be one which is made under optimum conditions: least emotional tumult, greatest
information and maximum participation of all people involved .... That's frequently not the case at
the outset of a baby's life ... ."); see id. at 44 (quoting a physician: "[The resident is] sweating his
brains out because he has a kid and an obstetrician's screaming and the parents are fainting and he is
supposed to be a doctor and taking care of this ... 1.
32. See Alan D. Bedrick, Driving Home at 5 AM, 146 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 281 (1992)
(describing a neonatologist's delivery-room uncertainty about viability). "Viable" means "capable of
life. This term is applied to a newly-born infant, and especially to one prematurely born, which is not
only born alive, but in such a state of organic development as to make possible the continuance of its
life." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990). The medical boundaries of viability are
uncertain and changing. First, the definition of viability has changed over time. At the time of the
Roe v. Wade decision, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the accepted medical limits of viability were 28 weeks
gestation and 1000 grams birth weight. Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping
Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 660 (1986). One 1990 medical dictionary retained this definition.
MOSBY'S MEDICAL NURSING DICTIONARY 1234 (1990). One 1993 medical dictionary, however,
defined the limits of viability as 24 weeks gestation and 500 grams birth weight. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 2131 (17th ed. 1993). Second, the age and weight limits of viability may
depend upon the resources of the medical center in which the infant is born. Roderic H. Phibbs,
Deiery-Room Management of the Extremely-Low-Birth-Weight Infant, in THE MICROPREMIE: THE
NEXr FRONTIER, REPORT OF THE NINETY-NINTH Ross CONFERENCE ON PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 13
(Richard M. Cowett & William W. Hay, Jr. eds., 1989). A doctor's personal viewpoints about viability
and prognosis also influence the delivery-room decision. E.g., Hack & Faranoff, supra note 21, at
660.
33. Phibbs, supra note 32, at 13.
34. Id.
35. FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 61-64.
36. See Stevenson et al., supra note 14, at 1911 (discussing uncertainty in diagnosis and
treatment decisions for premature infants).
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infants need to survive may also be harmful.3  Parents and doctors in
such cases may contemplate withdrawal of certain treatments or with-
holding of resuscitative measures.' The ethical and legal issues are diffi-
cult and unique.39
This Note will examine the issues of who should decide to withhold
or withdraw medical treatment from premature infants and how these
decisions should be made. Part II will examine the background and
development of federal law and regulations relating to medical care of
handicapped and disabled infants. While prematurity may not be a handi-
cap or disability in itself, it is frequently associated with complications
which may be handicaps or disabilities.40 Part III will analyze the federal
decision-making standards as well as alternative standards that courts
have used in cases of infants and incompetent adults. Part IV will discuss
the roles of various parties in the decision-making process. Part V will
conclude that parents and doctors should make such decisions with the
limited involvement of a hospital ethics committee, that judicial interven-
tion should rarely be necessary, and that quality of life considerations
must be part of a realistic benefits and burdens analysis.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL LAW
A. EARLY ATTENTION TO NEONATAL TREATMENT DECISION-
MAKING AND THE FIRST FEDERAL EFFORT TO
REGULATE THIS AREA
In the early 1970s, commentary began to appear in medical and legal
literature about the practice of "passive euthanasia" of very ill or handi-
capped newborns.41  This attention coincided with the United States
37. One three-year study of infants with birth weights under 750 grams showed that as the
infants lived longer, more deaths were treatment-related. Hack & Faranoff, supra note 21, at 662.
One doctor describes an example of this phenomenon:
I can't think of one infant under 1000 [grams] with grade IV [periventricular-
intraventricular hemorrhage] and hydrocephalus who has left our nursery. The infants
have lived for several months, even with hydrocephalus, but they have died of the
complications of our therapy as well as their disorders. Everything we do to treat
hydrocephalus just becomes more and more complex and produces more complications.
Papile, supra note 12, at 153-54. Treatments also may cause permanent disability, pain, and suffering.
Amnon Goldworth and David K. Stevenson, The Real Challenge of "Baby Doe-: Considering the
Sanctity and Quality of Life, 28 CUNICAL PEDIATRICS 119 (1989).
38. Stevenson et al., supra note 14, at 1909.
39. Some formulations of ethical guidelines for the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
care specifically exclude newborns from their application. American Thoracic Society, Withholding
and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 144 AM. REv. RESPIRATORY DISEASES 726 (1991);
HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE
CARE OF THE DYING 7 (David H. Smith & Robert M. Veatch eds., 1987).
40. Supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
41. See generally John Lantos, Baby Doe Five Years Later: Implications for Child Health, 317
NEW ENC. J. MED. 444 (1987).
1994]
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Supreme Court decision upholding the legality of abortion 42 and drew the
interest of right-to-life activists.43 Public interest in the medical treat-
ment of newborns was heightened in response to the 1982 Bloomington,
Indiana, "Baby Doe" case in which a state court upheld a parental deci-
sion to refuse surgery for an infant with Down's syndrome.4 The Reagan
Administration responded by ordering the Department of Health and
Human Services to enforce section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973' against hospitals receiving federal funds to prevent withholding of
medical services on the basis of handicap.46 The Department of Health
and Human Services promulgated regulations to ensure that handicapped
infants received "medically beneficial treatment" in such facilities.47 The
regulations required that hospitals post notices entitled "Principles of
Treatment of Disabled Infants '48 and encouraged hospitals to form Infant
Care Review Committees to be guided by principles set forth in the regu-
lations.49 In addition, they required enforcement by state child protective
agencies and established a 24-hour hotline to the Department of Health
and Human Services which anyone could call to report suspected non-
compliance.50  "Interpretive guidelines" accompanying the regulations
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Lantos, supra note 41, at 444-45.
44. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1519, 1587
(citing In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961
(1983), reprinted in Declaratory judgment in the Infant Doe Case, 2 IssuEs L. & MED. 77 (1986))
[hereinafter Developments]. For a detailed account of the facts of the case and the media's response,
see HELGA KUHSE & PETER SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIVE? 11-16 (1985).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a) (1998). The statute provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual
with handicaps... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ...." Id. The statute formerly used the words "handicapped
individual" instead of the current term, "individual with handicaps." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1985),
amended by 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1986).
"Individual with handicaps" is defined as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (Supp. 1991).
The regulations implementing section 504 define "major life activities" as "functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1992).
The Supreme Court has defined an "otherwise qualified" person under section 504 as "one who
is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406(1979).
46. KUHSE & SINGER, supra note 44, at 14, 21.
47. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 & app..C (1992). According to at least one commentator, these executive
actions were politically beneficial to the Reagan Administration because they appealed to right-to-life
activists and advocates for the handicapped as well as civil libertarians, thereby "winning friends and
dividing opponents .. .with only a small expenditure of regulatory and legal resources." Lantos,
supra note 41, at 445-46.
48. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b)(2) (1992). These notices to be posted "at location(s) where nurses and
other medical professionals ... will see [them]" and were required to state that "nourishment and
medically beneficial treatment ... should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the
basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical impairments." Id. at (b)(4).
49. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a)-(b), (f) (1992).
50. Id. § 84.55(b)-(e).
explained that "[flutile treatment or treatment that will do no more than
temporarily prolong the act of dying" was not required51 and left such
determinations to "reasonable medical judgment."5 2 They explained that
while the regulations were not applicable to parents, health care providers
must turn to child protective agencies or the courts if parents withheld
consent for "medically beneficial treatment or nourishment."5 3 The
guidelines also included the statement that "[w]ithholding of certain
potential treatments from a severely premature and low birth weight
infant on the grounds of reasonable medical judgments concerning the
improbability of success or risks of potential harm to the infant would not
violate section 504."54
The 1983 "Baby Jane Doe" case55 in which a New York court upheld
a parental refusal of surgery for an infant with spina bifida prompted the
first challenge to these regulations.56 A federal district court refused the
Department of Health and Human Services access to the child's records,
reasoning that the hospital had not violated section 504 because it was not
required to perform surgery when the parents had reasonably decided to
refuse consent.57 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
finding that section 504 did not apply to treatment decisions involving
defective newborns 58 because although handicapped, they were not
"otherwise qualified" for services as section 504 required. 9
The regulations were later invalidated by the Supreme Court
because the Department of Health and Human Services had failed to
show any evidence of discrimination by hospitals which would necessitate
the regulations.60 A plurality of the Court also indicated that the regula-
51. Id. at pt. 84 app. C at (a)(2).
52. Id. at (a)(3).
53. Id. at (a)(4).
54. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. C at (a)(5)(iv) (1992).
55. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687, affd per curiam on other grounds, 456
N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
56. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1984).
57. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 614-15.
58. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 156. The court explained that:
section 504 prohibits discrimination against a handicapped individual only where the
individual's handicap is unrelated to, and thus improper to consideration of, the services
in question. . . . [H]owever, where medical treatment is at issue, it is typically the
handicap itself that gives rise to, or at least contributes to,. the need for services.
•.. [T]he phrase "otherwise qualified" isgeared toward relatively static programs or
activities such as education, employment, and trans rtation systems. As a result, the
phrase cannot be applied in the comparatively fuid context of medical treatment
decisions without distorting its plain meaning.
Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to explain that the legislative history of section 504 did not
reflect any intention on the part of Congress that the statute would apply to medical treatment deci-
sions involving newborns. Id. at 157-61.
60. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 631-39 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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tions intruded on state authority by imposing enforcement requirements
on state child protective agencies." However, the Court left open the
question of whether section 504 could ever apply to neonatal treatment
decisions.62
B. THE SECOND FEDERAL EFFORT TO REGULATE NEONATAL
TREATMENT DECISION-MAKING
After taking testimony from various right-to-life and disability groups
and professional medical organizations,r Congress passed the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984 to pick up where the first federal effort had
failed. 64 The 1984 provisions amended the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act6 [hereinafter CAPTA] to prevent "medical neglect,"
which included the "withholding of medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions."66 Federal funding
under CAPTA was conditioned upon enforcement by state child-protec-
tive agencies.6 7  'Withholding of medically indicated treatment" was
defined as the failure to provide treatment most likely to correct life-
threatening conditions, with limited exceptions based upon an infant's
potential for survival."8 "[A]ppropriate nutrition, hydration, and medica-
tion" were to be provided in all cases regardless of survivability. 9
Again the Department of Health and Human Services promulgated
regulations to implement the law.7' The regulations defined an "infant"
as "an infant less than one year of age."71 However, they included a refer-
61. Id. at 639-42.
62. Id. at 624.
63. See Stephen A. Newman, Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the Federal
Treatment Standard for Impaired Infants, 15 AM. J. LAw & MED. 1, 6-7 (1989) (noting that no true
consensus was reached among the professional medical groups, as the American Medical Association
and the Association of Medical Colleges, representing most of the tertiary care facilities for newborns
in the country, opposed the law).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a-5106b, 5106g (1988).
65. 42 U.S.C. 99 5101-5106h (1988).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1988).
67. Id. But cf Newman, supra note 63, at 6 (noting that funding under CAPTA is relatively low
in comparison to other federal programs, so that a state may not be losing much money if it does not
comply with the law).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(IO) (1988). The exceptions to the treatment requirement are as follows:
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would-
(i) merely prolong dying;
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening
conditions; or
(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of
the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
Id.
69. Id.
70. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1992).
71. Id. § 1340.15 (b)(3)(i).
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ence to premature infants quite different from that in the former set of
regulations:7' "In addition to their applicability to infants less than one
year of age, the standards set forth in... this section should be consulted
thoroughly in the evaluation of any issue of medical neglect involving an
infant . .. who was born extremely prematurely ... "73
Interpretive guidelines which accompanied the regulations made
clear the Department's emphasis on survivability as the key factor in
determining whether treatment was beneficial.'4 The guidelines emphat-
ically rejected "quality of life" considerations.75
The federal attempts to regulate neonatal treatment decision-making
under section 504 and under CAPTA have been criticized extensively.
76
They have caused confusion for judges77 and physicians 8 about what
standards should be used in deciding to withdraw medical treatment from
newborns. Uncertainty is heightened with regard to premature infants
because it is unclear whether the current federal regulations are even
applicable in these cases.79 It is useful to examine the substantive differ-
ences among the federal standards and alternative decision-making stan-
dards which have been proposed by courts and commentators for making
decisions to withdraw medical treatment from infants.
III. DECISION-MAKING STANDARDS
A. THE NONDISCRIMINATION STANDARD
The federal regulations which were promulgated under section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act and subsequently invalidated 0 employed a non-
72. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (quoting the reference to premature infants found
in the first set of federal regulations).
73. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(3)(i).
74. 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 app.
75. Id. at (9). The guidelines also provided definitions for terms used in the statutory exceptions
to the treatment requirement, stating that -virtually futile" meant "highly unlikely to prevent death in
the near future" and that "inhumane" treatment would only include treatment that was medically
contraindicated or that would cause "significant pain and suffering.., for an infant highly unlikely to
survive." Id. at (8) & (9). The guidelines also stated that if parents refused consent tor a treatment
that would not in itself improve all life-threatening conditions but which was recommended as part of
an overall treatment plan, child protective services should take action. Id. at (4).
76. See infra parts III.A-B.
77. The few state courts to address the federal laws and regulations have accorded them little
weight. See In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365, 372 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
the parents' decision to withdraw life su port from a terminally ill infant, but only referring to federal
requirements in a footnote which stated: "Of course, all medical and hospital personnel will have to
abide by any state or federal regulations in this area."); see also In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1185 n.1
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (MeMorrow, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d 1264 (I11. 993) (noting that
the federal law regarding nutrition, hydration, and medication did not apply in a case involving a "Do
Not Resuscitate" order Tor a terminally ill infant).
78. E.g., Developments, supra note 44, at 1591.
79. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (comparing the references to premature
infants in the two sets of federal regulations).
80. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
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discrimination approach to medical decision-making for handicapped
infants."' While this simple approach may work well in certain cases
when the handicap is unrelated to the life-threatening condition, such
cases are rare.8 2 This approach is especially ineffective with premature
infants because of the number and complexity of their medical problems
which often give rise to serious disabilities if the infants survive.83 Com-
mentators have also criticized this approach because it ignores the infant's
future incapacities, no matter how severe they may be.84
Despite these criticisms, the nondiscrimination standard has
received renewed attention in recent court cases.15 A federal district
court in Virginia found in a 1993 case' that a hospital's withholding of
ventilator treatment from an infant with anencephaly would violate the
Rehabilitation Act because, unlike the parents in the University Hospi-
tal8 7 and Johnson s cases, the infant's mother had requested that the
treatment continue.8 9 The hospital had conceded that the infant's
anencephaly, which the court found to be a handicap under the Act, was
81. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 & app. C (1992). See also Dolores M. Coulter, The "Baby Doe" Dilemma:
Withholding Treatment from Disabled Infants, 60 MIcu. B. J. 40, 44 (Jan. 1987) (explaining that the
federal regulations required that handicap should not be relevant to a treatment decision).
82. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life
Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283, 1299 (1985). As one physician explains,
In most cases, it is impossible to distinguish neatly medical conditions that need
treatment from "handicaps." The further one gets from the Baby Doe paradigm of a
baby with an underlying condition like Down's syndrome and a medical problem, such as
esophageal atresia, that is easily separable from the underlying condition, the harder it is
to distinguish discrimination from medical judgment, and the more inappropriate it is to
use the Rehabilitation Act.
Lantos, supra note 41, at 445-46.
83. See Coulter, supra note 81, at 44.
84. E.g., Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1299-1302.
85. A federal district court in Pennsylvania found in a 1988 case that parents of an infant with
cystic fibrosis had failed to state a claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for discrimination
because infancy could not be characterized as a handicap. Cerben v. Holsclaw, 692 F. Supp. 557,
563-64 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The parents had alleged discrimination in the form of aggressive medical
treatment that would not have been provided if the infant had "been a conscious adult able to speak
for herself." Id. at 560. Thus, while the treatment was related to the handicapping condition (i.e., the
cystic fibrosis), the basis of the asserted discrimination claim (i.e., the patient's age) did not fall within
the Rehabilitation Act. See id.
In 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that no claim existed under section
504 for failure to treat infants with spina bifida due to socioeconomic discrimination. Johnson by
Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1255 (1993).
The court explained that section 504 did not apply to "discrimination among similarly handicapped
persons" on the basis of socioeconomic status, but only to discrimination based upon the handicap
itself. Id. The court also stated that no claim existed under section 504 for discrimination based upon
anticipated handicap because the infants were not "otherwise qualified" for treatment under section
504. Id. Like the court in University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984), supra notes 58-59
and accompanying text, the Johnson court was unable to distinguish the handicap from the medical
condition that would qualify the infant for treatment. Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1493.
86. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
87. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
88. Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1255 (1993).
89. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028. Anencephaly is a congenital defect in which most or all of the
brain is missing. Id. at 1025.
the sole reason for withholding treatment. 0 The court also found that
withholding ventilator treatment from the infant would violate the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 9' which prohibits discrimination by
"public accommodations, 9 2 including hospitals,93 against an individual
with a disability. 4 "Disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.""
Furthermore, the court noted that unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA
does not require the handicapped individual to be "otherwise qualified"
for services.96
Because an infant need not be "otherwise qualified" for services
under the ADA, it is possible that a court may uphold a discrimination
claim for withholding medical treatment even when parents have not con-
sented to the treatment. 7 While the ADA may revive the nondiscrimina-
tion standard of decision-making for infants, a standard of decision-
making based solely upon a nondiscrimination principle nevertheless may
be inadequate in many cases.98
B. THE SURVIVABILITY STANDARD OF THE CHILD ABUSE
AMENDMENTS
The Child Abuse Amendments of 19849 and associated federal reg-
ulations 1°° seem to require that medical decisions be based only upon an
infant's potential for survival and that treatment be provided unless the
infant is highly unlikely to survive.' 0 ' Only the exception for an infant
who is "chronically and irreversibly comatose" is clearly not based upon
survivability. 102 Physicians and commentators have criticized this narrow
federal standard.'°3 First, the exception for the "chronically and irreversi-
bly comatose" infant has been criticized for being too narrow."x° As one
90. Id. at 1027.
91. Id. at 1029.
92. Id. at 1028 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182).
93. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)).
94. Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1028 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
95. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
96. Id. at 1028.
97. Cf. id. (relying in part upon a parental request for treatment in ordering continued
treatment).
98. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the nondiscrimination
standard).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a-5106b, 5106g (1991).
100. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1992).
101. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10)(A) (1991). But Wf Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1313-17 (arguing that
the exceptions to the treatment requirement implicitly recognize quality of life considerations);
Developments, supra note 44, at 1602-03 (asserting that the exceptions allow "quality-of-life
considerations [to]enter the decisionmaking process unacknowledged and unexamined").
103. E.g., Loretta M. Koplman et al., Neonatologists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regulations, 318
NEw ENG.J. MED. 677, 681 (1988).
104. I•
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physician explains, "[d]etermining which of several states of permanent
unconsciousness the infant is in may be a difficult, technical decision, and
it is not clear why distinguishing between them is relevant in deciding
whether nontreatment is justified."'o° For example, a persistent vegeta-
tive state is unlike a coma in that it involves a sleep-wake cycle, some eye
movement, and some reflexive action; yet, it is nevertheless a state of per-
manent unconsciousness in which the patient has no awareness." ° Other
exceptions to the treatment requirement also have been criticized. The
exception for treatment that would "merely prolong dying,"107 for
instance, may be vague in some cases, especially when advanced life-sup-
port technology is available.' 08 The exception for treatment that would be
both virtually futile and inhumane seems to require physicians to provide
inhumane treatment unless it is also virtually futile, or virtually futile
treatment unless it is also inhumane." ° This standard could lead to an
illogical course of treatment for a premature infant."10 The law's require-
ment for "appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication""' regardless
of prognosis also has been criticized for allowing potentially inconsistent
105. Ii
106. Newman, supra note 63, at 24-25. A Florida court, in a decision made before the current
federal law was passed, allowed withdrawal of life-support systems from an infant in a persistent
vegetative state who was terminally ill but who could have lived more than two years with the life-
support systems. In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 367-68, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
See also In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (Ga. 1984) (affirming a parental decision to withdraw life-
support systems from an infant in a "chronic vegetative state," but providing no estimate of life
expectancy with continued treatment). Such decisions made for incompetent adults also have been
respected. Newman, supra note 63, at 25. See also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655, 671 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (allowing withdrawal of life-support systems from a 22-year-old woman
while characterizing her condition asboth "comatose" and a "persistent 'vegetative' state" but stating
that she did exhibit eye movement and reaction to light and sound).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10)(i) (1991).
108. Kopelman et al., supra note 103, at 682.
109. Newman, supra note 63, at 27.
110. Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1315.
[The standard] could thus justify, for example, withholding dialysis or cardiac surgery
from the extremely premature infant who fias suffered severe lung damage, brain
hemorrhages and other calamities, and who now experiences heart disease or kidney
failure. Given the pain and invasion of cardiac surgery or renal dialysis and the infant's
slim chance of survival, doctors could view such treatments as "inhumane."
It would appear, however, that if such an infant developed an infection responsive to
antibiotics, antibiotic treatment would be required because, while virtually futile, such
treatment itself is not painful. But why not allow decision-makers to ask whether simply
extending such an infant's life would itself be inhumane ... ?
111. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10) (1988).
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actions" and for the vagueness of the term "appropriate."' 1 3 In practice,
courts have used alternative legal standards."
4
C. "SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT" VS. "BEST INTERESTS"
A competent patient is able to provide informed consent for medical
care, including the withholding or withdrawal of treatment." 5 An incom-
petent patient is unable to make such decisions." 6 A surrogate decision-
maker must decide whether to accept or reject medical treatment on
behalf of the incompetent person. 117  In doing so, the decision-maker
"must seek to respect simultaneously both aspects of the patient's right to
self-determination-the right to live, and the right, in some cases, to die
of natural causes without medical intervention.""" Courts have described
two related standards for making such decisions on behalf of incompetent
persons: the "substituted judgment" standard" 9 and the "best interests"
standard.'
The substituted judgment standard requires the decision-maker "to
ascertain the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences" and
to attempt to make the decision which that particular incompetent person
would make if he or she were competent.12 ' Some courts have attempted
to use this standard when dealing with infants.' 2 2 A Florida court pur-
ported to employ the substituted judgment approach in allowing the with-
112. Newman, supra note 63, at 28-31. For a more detailed discussion of the criteria to be
considered in making decisions about specific medical procedures or treatments, see infra part
III.D.2.
113. See Kopelman et al., supra note 103, at 682 (explaining that the term "appropate" may
mean appropriate for a medical condition considered alone or appropriate for an inidual patient
with that condition and noting that "traditional medical judgment" considers the latter).
114. See infra parts III.C-E (discussing decision-making standards that courts have used in
resolving medical treatment questions for in ants and other incompetent patients).
115. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990) (citing ZeBarth Swedish Hosp. Ctr., 499
P.2d 1, 8 (Wa. 1972), and defining "informed consent" as the principle of disclosure which allows the
.patient ... faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or
none at all, [to] intelligently exercise his judgment ... "; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222
(N.J. 1985). The Conroy court stated that
[t]he doctrine of informed consent presup ses that the patient has the information
necessary to evaluate the risks and benefits ofa the available options and is competent to
do so....
The patient's ability to control his bodily integrity through informed consent is
significant only when one recognizes that this right also encompasses a right to informed
refusal.
Id. (citing Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1648 (1974)).
116. E.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1209, 1227.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977).
120. E.g., In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wash. 1984).
121. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431. For an account of the historical development of the
substituted judgment standard, see id.
122. E.g., In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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drawal of life-support systems from a ten-month-old child but recognized
that the doctrine was "difficult to apply to children" and that the court
was actually "guided primarily by the judgment of the parents.""z '
Because of the impossibility of ascertaining an infant's preferences or
wishes about life-sustaining treatment, other courts have specifically
rejected the substituted judgment standard in cases involving infants.
12
4
In cases involving incompetent patients whose preferences about
life-sustaining treatment are not known, courts have used a best interests
of the patient standard.'25 Unlike the subjective approach of the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine, the best interests standard is objective in that a
decision is based upon the patient's best interests as determined by a sur-
rogate decision-maker.26 "Objective societally shared criteria" may be
used.12 7  However, the individual patient's best interests are determined
with regard to his or her unique situation.12 8 Courts have used this stan-
dard in cases involving minors whose preferences about life-sustaining
treatment are unknown.'12  Physicians also have relied upon a best inter-
ests standard in making medical decisions for children. 13°
123. Id. at 371.
124. See In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that "as app lied to
immature minors and other never-competent patients, the substituted judgment standard is
inappropriate because it cannot be ascertained what choice the patient would have made if
competent"); In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) cert. denied, 610 N.E. 2d 1264
(I11. 1993) (observing that "[tihe substituted judgment test is of limited relevance in the case of
immature minors" and that "[i]f anyone's judgment is being substituted, it is that of the parents or
some other person with a close interest in the child's welfare").
125. E.g., In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wash. 1984). Cf. In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (N.J. 1985) (proposing a three-tiered test based upon the degree of
knowledge about the incompetent patient's preferences, so that a subjective standard is used when
the patient's preferences are known, a "limited-objective test" is used when "some trustworthy
evidence" exists about the patient's preferences, and a "pure-objective test" is used when no evidence
about the patient's preferences is available).
126. See Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (Mass. 1978) (comparing the substituted
judgment and best interests standards).
127. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 721 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984)
(determining the criteria to be used in deciding tie best interests of an incompetent patient when no
expression has been made about treatment preferences). See also Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (referring to objective criteria such as "relief of suffering, the
preservation or restoration of functioning and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained").
128. E.g., Hamlin, 689 P.2d at 1372, 1375 (emphasizing that such "decisions must be made on a
case-by-case basis with particularized consideration of the best interests and rights of the specific
individual").
129. E.g., In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 635, 639 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (using a best
interests standard for a ten-year-old girl in a persistent vegetative state because she was an "immature
minor" whose choice could not be ascertained).
130. Kopelman et al., supra note 103, at 683 ("There is a longstanding, well-accepted medical
... tradition of basing medical care for children on a determination of their-est interests (known as
the 'best-interest standard' of medical care).").
NOTE
D. BALANCING BENEFITS AND BURDENS
In ascertaining the patient's best interests, courts have balanced the
benefits and burdens of treatment.13 1 The federal standard has been crit-
icized for ignoring this aspect of the decision-making process by assuming
that treatment will always be a benefit unless the infant is highly unlikely
to survive. 3 Realistically, it has been argued that the present and future
burdens of the patient's medical disorders and treatments must be
weighed against the present and future benefits of those treatments.13
Physicians have endorsed this standard." Likewise, courts have
employed a benefits and burdens balancing standard in deciding whether
life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn from incompetent
patients. 135
Questions may arise under the benefits and burdens analysis as to
what factors should be considered.'3 These questions include: 1)
whether and how "quality of life" considerations should influence a treat-
ment decision;' 37 2) whether a treatment decision should turn on the
nature of the particular treatment technology, 8 and 3) whether burdens
on people other than the patient should receive consideration.'
39
131. E.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (N.J. 1985).
132. E.g., Newman, supra note 63, at 37.
133. See id. at 37-41 (arguing that burdens of medical disorders and treatments should be
considered).
134. See, e.g., Task Force on Ethics of the Society of Critical Care Medicine, 18 CRITICAL CARE
MED. 1435, 1435 (1990) (stating that "[a]ny treatment derives its medical justification from the
benefits that [it is] hope[d] to achieve- and that "[f'oregoing therapy should be discussed... [w]hen
the burdens of therapy outweigh the benefits").
135. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1209, 1232 (employing a "pure-objective test" when no evidence
of the patient's preferences exists, under which treatment may be withheld if "the net burdens of the
patient's life with the treatment . . . clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient
derives from life," and if the degree of pain and suffering would make the treatment inhumane); see
also Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (using a benefits and
burdens balancing test in permitting the withdrawal of life-support systems from an adult in a
persistent vegetative state). The Barber court explained that
proportionate treatment is that which ... has at least a reasonable chance of providing
enefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment.
Thus, even if a proposed course of treatment might be extremel painful or intrusive, it
would still be proportionate treatment if the prognosis was for a complete cure or
significant improvement in the patient's condition. On the other hand, a treatment
course which is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be considered
disproportionate to the potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for any
significant improvement in condition.
Id.
136. See infra parts III.D.1-3 (discussing possible considerations in a benefits and burdens
analysis).
137. See infra part III.D.1.
138. See infra part III.D.2.
139. See infra part III.D.3.
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1. "Quality of Life" Considerations
The meaning of "quality of life" has been a source of confusion in
treatment decisions for incompetent patients.' 4° One court, for example,
rejected "assessments of the personal worth or social utility of another's
life" as improper "quality of life" judgments. 141 However, the same court
employed a benefits and burdens analysis which involved other quality of
life considerations in weighing pain and suffering against "possible enjoy-
ment" of life.1 42 These quality of life considerations focus on the quality
of the individual's life to that individual.'4'
Rejecting quality of life judgments would require maximum treat-
ment to preserve biological life in all cases.'" This approach would vio-
late widely-accepted moral and religious beliefs about the nature of
personhood, 14' beliefs which give value to "pleasure, thought, emotion,
and recognition of and interaction with others.""46 It would also run
counter to views expressed by many adults about when they would want
treatment withdrawn from themselves. 147 Many of those who take care of
the sickest infants on a daily basis reject this absolutist view as well.148 At
least one court upholding a decision to withdraw life-support systems
from an adult also explicitly rejected this view.
149
140. E.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (N.J. 1985) (stating that pain, suffering, and a
dim prognosis "[do] not mean that [the patient] is not enjoying what remains of his life"); but see
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (Mass. 1977) (stating
that continuing pain and suffering should be considered when placing a value on the "quality of life").
141. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
142. Id.
143. In attempting to evaluate the subjective quality of life of an individual who has never been
competent, reference is made to objective criteria. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text
(discussing cases in which courts referred to objective criteria in determining the best interests of
incompetent patients). However, this evaluation differs from a quality of life analysis which looks only
at the individual's worth to others and does not consider the experiences of the individual. See
Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1334-38 (discussing the Saikewicz and Conroy decisions and the
interpretation of "quality of life").
144. Developments, supra note 44, at 1603.
145. See id. (comparing mainstream religious views of human life with those of the right-to-life
movement).
146. Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1320.
147. See Coldworth & Stevenson, supra note 37, at 121 (noting that many adults have expressed
a preference for death over medical intervention that would produce continued pain and suffering
and that treatment which saves an infant's life "may produce the very state that much of the public
has accepted as justifying adult individuals in preferring death to life").
148. See FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 29. Frohock describes a discussion with NICU nurses:
They tell me it is impossible for anyone who is a strict right-to-lifer to work in the
nursery. If you are one, you will change your views after being there a short while. All
the nurses talking to me believe that the quality of life is important in deciding whether a
life is worth living and a baby worth saving.
Id.
149. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (stating that "the
focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to a cognitive
and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative existence to
which Karen seems to be doomed").
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Quite a number of specific criteria may be relevant to quality of life
considerations in a benefits and burdens analysis.'-" One commentator
has proposed a standard which would guide decision-making with refer-
ence to the relative weight of medical criteria.' 5 ' This quality of life stan-
dard would permit withdrawal of aggressive treatment if an infant faces
any one of the following outcomes: certain death during infancy, perma-
nent unconsciousness, unceasing pain, dependance on invasive and
restrictive technology such as a respirator, or an incapacity for human
interaction. 152  However, this standard may be helpful only in the rare
cases in which prognosis is relatively certain.' In practice, physicians
constantly reevaluate and balance medical criteria and quality of life fac-
tors when determining treatment in uncertain cases.5
2. Distinctions Among Specific Medical Procedures
When it is determined that certain treatments are no longer in the
infant's best interests and should be withdrawn, questions may arise as to
whether other, less aggressive, treatments should be continued.'- The
federal standard requires that "appropriate nutrition, hydration, and med-
ication" should be maintained in all cases, regardless of survivability or the
status of other treatment.156 Commentators have criticized this distinc-
tion between nutrition, hydration, and medication as opposed to other
treatments, noting that such a standard can lead to inconsistent treatment
and may needlessly prolong suffering.' 57 Physicians' organizations have
150. One commentator suggests that the following factors should be weighed:
medical diagnosis; clinical course of medical conditions since birth; length of life
expectancy; survival chan d without treatment; exted neurological, physicaland mental impairment; developmental potential; availability of corrective treatment;extent of treatment benefits if cure is not possible; pain and suffering associated with
medical condition; pain and suffering associated with treatment; invasiveness,
stresfulness, and duration of treatment; need for repeated medical interventions; need
for lengthy hospitalization or institutionalization; risks associated with treatment;, and theproven, experimental, or untested nature of treatment.
Newman, supra note 63, at 50.
151. Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1322-23.
152. Id.153. Id. at 1323.
154. See Fischer & Stev'enson, supra note 22. at 1930-31 (explaining that a "wait until certainty"
approach, when used in all cases, prolongs suffering for vey disabled infants, while an "individualized
prognostic strategy" allows reeamination of a treatment plan over time based upon statisticalestimates and the individual infant's response to treatment; for eample, for infants with birth weightsof 500 to 800 grams who are dependant on ventilators after 28 das and who have a poor clinical
histoy as well as a poor statistical mortality estimate, withdrawal of aggressive support is discussed
with parents).
155. E.g., Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1325.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(0) (1988).7 See Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1325 (noting that when prolonged life has been found not tobe in the child's best interests, further "treatments inconsistent with this recognition" should not he
provided); Developments supra note 44, at 1601 ("Continued provision of food and water... mayrender the original decision to withhold treatment both meaningless and cruel."); Newman, supranote 63. at 29 ("Does the permanently vegetative infant, whose damaged brain can support vital signs
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specifically disagreed with the federal requirement to provide nutrition,
hydration and medication to infants in all cases,15 8 and ethical standards
developed by a variety of experts have rejected the view that such treat-
ments are always advisable.' 59
Some courts also have refused to employ distinctions between types
of treatment. " A California court, for instance, found no ethical or legal
difference between a respirator and intravenous feedings.' 6 ' While rec-
ognizing that nourishment carried "emotional symbolism," the court
explained that "medical procedures to provide nutrition and hydration are
more similar to other medical procedures than to typical human ways of
providing nutrition and hydration" and stated that "[tlheir benefits and
burdens ought to be evaluated in the same manner as any other medical
procedure. "162 In agreeing with this reasoning, a New Jersey court
explained that "artificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes, gastrostomies,
and intravenous infusions are significantly different from bottle-feeding or
spoonfeeding-they are medical procedures with inherent risks and pos-
sible side effects ....- 163 Like respirators, they "prolong life through
mechanical means when the body is no longer able to perform a vital
bodily function on its own. " "
3. Burdens on Others
Family members of an infant with severe incapacities face burdens of
their own.65 The financial cost of long-term neonatal intensive care is
enormous.'" An anencephalic infant who was the subject of a 1993 court
decision 67 had so far spent approximately 120 days in a Virginia hospital
but not consciousness, truly benefit from feeding tubes that may prolong a vegetative existence for
years? ).
158. E.g., Task Force on Ethics of the Society of Critical Care Medicine, supra note 134, at 1439
(stating that the federal standard is "overly restrictive" and that nutrition, hydration, and medication
.may be ethically unjustified" when the physician feels that they "are harmful to the patient's
interests").
159. E.g., HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 39, at 60 (noting that although nutrition and hydration
usually are beneficial, their use should be evaluated in each individual's case); id. at 65 (explaining
that medication may be burdensome in certain cases, as when it must be injected repeatedly or when
it causes complications).
160. E.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
161. Id.
162. Id. The Barber court also refused to distinguish between -disconnecting" life-support
machines and withholding "manually administered" treatments, explaining that discontinuing
machines should be viewed as an omission rather than an affirmative act. Id.
163. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985).
164. Id. See also In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (characterizing
nutrition as a medical treatment and refusing to order surgical implantation of a feeding tube for an
incompetent adult due to the invasiveness of the procedure and other risk factors).
165. E.g., FROHOCE, supra note 13, at 138 (discussing financial burdens on families).
166. See, e.g., id at 138 (noting that at one hospital, the average daily cost of an NICU patient
was approximately one-third greater than the hospital average and exceeded only by the cost of adult
intensive care).
167. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd., 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
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"at a minimum cost of $1,450 a day.""6 Very premature infants, when
they survive, usually remain in intensive care for many weeks.'6 9 If they
remain incapacitated and dependant upon life-support machines, they
may stay in a hospital indefinitely.'70 It is almost always impossible for
families to pay for this type of long-term hospital care themselves, and
insurance or governmental assistance will not always make up the differ-
ence. 17' Families also suffer severe emotional strain in such situations.' 72
The financial and emotional impact can have a harmful effect on sib-
lings, 173 as well as on the parents' marriage.174 When a severely impaired
infant is able to leave the hospital, these factors may combine to make it
impossible for parents to provide adequate care for the infant at home.' 75
The family may find it necessary to place the child in an institution, which
in itself may affect the child's quality of life.' 76
Some commentators argue that family considerations (such as the
availability of long-term home care or institutionalization) are not relevant
in a benefits and burdens analysis.1i At the other end of the spectrum,
one physician has proposed a quality of life standard that would accord
such factors as much weight as the infant's long-term medical progno-
sis.' 78 Few courts have dealt directly with these issues.'7 9
168. Momfights for Baby's Life, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 1993, at 5A.
169. See Cowett, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that most extremely-low-birth-weight infants
(weighing under 1000 grams at birth) "stay in the nursery until at least the time they were due to be
born at term").
170. FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 37.
171. Id. at 138 (explaining that Medicaid, the principal source of funds for intensive care, pays a
maximum daily rate which falls considerably short of the average daily cost of neonatal intensive care).
See also Newman, supra note 63, at 52 (posing the question: "[i]f [the government] will not itself pay
these astronomical bills, should it tell a family to take the risk of going bankrupt for a chance, perhaps
slim, that an infant will survive, but with a lifelong, incurable major impairment?").
172. Developments, supra note 44, at 1605.
173. Newman, supra note 63, at 52.
174. GUSTArrs & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 239.
175. See Newman, supra note 63, at 53 (explaining that such children may need constant
supervision and assistance with basic functions).
176. See GUSTArIIS & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 238-39 (discussing the chronological progression
from therapy programs to foster homes or pediatric facilities and, finally, to state hospitals or adult
programs where a patient shares one caretaker with many other patients); Newman, supra note 63, at
53-54 (discussing the poor quality of some pediatric nursing homes).
177. See Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1322 (arguing that "social factors" should not be considered
in medical decision-making because social problems can be changed and because child custody can
be resolved separately from medical treatment issues).
178. See GUsTArrs & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 192 (describing a formula of "QOL = NE x (H +
S)," in which QOL is quality of life, NE is natural endowment, and H and S are the contributions
from home and society, respectively, so that a child with a higher natural endowment might still have
a very poor quality of life if no contribution can be expected from home or society).
179. But see Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (applying a
best interests analysis to approve withdrawal of life-support systems from an adult and giving weight
to "the impact of the decision on those people closest to the patient" because "most people are
concerned about the well-being of their loved ones"). Cf. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482
A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (noting that the family of an adult patient "ha[d] no financial
interest in the outcome of [the] proceeding" to terminate life-support systems, as expenses were
covered). See also In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(allowing withdrawal of life-support systems from an infant in a persistent vegetative state and noting
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E. BALANCING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
In making treatment decisions for incompetent patients, many courts
have used a second balancing test in conjunction with the benefits and
burdens analysis under which they weigh the rights of the patient against
the interests of the state." ° Courts have found that an incompetent adult
possesses the same right to reject life-sustaining treatment as a competent
patient and that a surrogate decision-maker may exercise this right on
behalf of the patient."" This right to reject life-sustaining treatment
stems in part from the common law right to control one's own body.'"2 It
also may stem from federal constitutional protections of privacy.'3
Finally, a right to refuse medical treatment may stem from state constitu-
tional guarantees of privacy and from state statutes specifically granting
such a right.'8'
The state's interest in the preservation of life is the most significant
interest which may be balanced against the right of an individual to refuse
medical treatment. 1as This interest may be seen as encompassing both an
interest in the individual patient's life and "an interest in preserving the
sanctity of all life."' Other state interests include prevention of suicide,
protection of third parties, and protection of the integrity of the medical
profession.8 7 In the case of a competent adult, these state interests usu-
that the parents' decision "was not motivated by any financial strain" because insurance was covering
the infant's medical bills).
180. E.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-27 (N.J. 1985).
181. E.g., id. See also Foody 482 A.2d at 717-20 (reasoning that "[t]o deny the exercise because
the patient is unconscious or incompetent would be to deny the right.... It is incumbent upon the
state to afford an incompetent the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent
persons"). But see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1990)
(refusing to decide the question of whether an incompetent person had the same right to refuse
treatment as a competent person and stating that "[an incompetent person is not able to make an
informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other
right").
182. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1221 (explaining that the doctrine of informed consent protects a
patient's control over his or her body and includes "a right to informed refusal"); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977) (expressing this concept as
the right to be "free from nonconsensual invasion of... bodily integrity").
183. The Quinlan court first articulated this concept, citing Supreme Court decisions which had
anted constitutional protection to certain privacy interests. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663
.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)). The Supreme Court, while not explicitly affirming a constitutional privacy right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment, agreed in a 1990 case that this right could "be inferred from [its] prior
decisions." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The Court assumed "for purposes of [the] case .. .that the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 279.
184. See In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that this right may
be derived from a statute); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(noting that the state constitution expressly guaranteed a right of privacy). See generally Newman,
supra note 63 (discussing state constitutional barriers to federal regulation of neonatal treatment
decisions).
185. E.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223.
186. Id.
187. E.g., id at 1224-25.
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ally are readily outweighed by the individual's rights of self-determination
and privacy.18 Courts also have found that an incompetent patient's
rights outweigh these state interests. 18 9
The right to forego life-sustaining treatment has been extended to
incompetent minors as well as adults.' 9 When minors are involved, three
sets of rights or interests must be balanced; in addition to the rights of
the patient and the interests of the state, parental rights must be consid-
ered. 19' Protection of parental decision-making authority stems from
United States Supreme Court cases such as Parham v. J.R.,'9 2 Wisconsin
v. Yoder,193 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,194 and Meyer v. Nebraska."9 This
protected parental authority has been found to include decisions about
medical treatment for children. 1' 6 In several cases upholding a parental
refusal of life-saving or life-sustaining treatment for a child on nonreli-
gious grounds, courts have accorded considerable weight to parental
rights.'97 However, most of these described the parental right not simply
188. See id. at 1224-26 (explaining that certain state interests were inapplicable to a competent
person's decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment because withdrawing treatment was not suicide,
the medical profession did not require treatment in all cases, and third party interests were significant
only in cases where public health or potential abandonment of children was involved). See also
Superintendent of Be chertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1976). The
Saikewicz court explained:
The constitutional right to privacy .. , is an expression of the sanctity of individual free
choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. The value of life as so
perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a
competent human being the right of choice.
Id.
189. See e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(explaining that "the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as thedegree of bodily invasion increases and theprognosis dims" and that '[uiltimately there comes a point
at which the individual's rights overcome the State interest").190. E.g., In rn L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 636
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
191. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2[ 1053, 1061-62 (Mass. 1978). See also Developments, supra
note 44, at 1594-1600 (discussing parental and individual rights, state interests, and the merits of
rights and obligations theories in the context of medical decision-maling for children).
192. 442 U.S. 584, 602-603 (1979). The Parham court explained that:
[t]he law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that puents ssess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity fur judgment required fur making life's
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id. at 602.
193. 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (recognizing a parental right stemming from the right of free
exercise of religion to determine a child's religious and educational upbringing).
194. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing a parental right to determine a child's education).
195. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing parental child-raising rights).
196. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (Mass. 1978) (stating that courts have
been reluctant to override parental refusals of medical treatment when "the child's condition is notlife-threatening, and [when the proposed treatmen it s e risk). See also Robyn S. Shapiro
& Richard Barthel, Infant Care Review Committees: An Effective Approach to the Baby Doe
Dilemma?, 37 Hs'r6US L.J. 827, 828-32 (1986) (discussing cases involving parental decisions about
medical treatment for older children).
197. See In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (upholding a parental decision to
withdraw life-support systems from an infant in a chronic vegetative state); in r Rosebush, 491
N.W.2d 633, 636-37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a parental decision to withdraw life-support
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as an independent right of control over the child but as a capacity to
determine the child's best interests and "speak for" the child, in effect,
exercising the child's right on behalf of the child. 198 Courts in other
cases, however, found that the parental right to withhold treatment was
outweighed by the interests of the child and the state when life-saving
treatment was promising.' 99
The practice of balancing rights and interests in making treatment
decisions for minors has been criticized. 2° One commentator asserts that
the focus on parental rights is unwise because traditional rights theories
involve individuals vis-a-vis the state, and that this approach breaks down
when children's rights are also involved.201 A right-to-life standard as
applied to seriously ill and incapacitated infants also has been criticized
because it "ignores the fact that health is the primary goal of medicine,
not simply the maintenance of life." 2
IV. PARTIES IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
A. PARENTS
Physicians have recognized the importance of the parental role in
making treatment decisions for infants, particularly premature infants
whose cases are often uncertain.20 3 Courts also have recognized the
systems from a minor in a persistent vegetative state); In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50-51 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (upholding a parental refusal of corrective heart surgery for twelve-year-old child with
Down's syndrome).
198. See In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) ("In any discussion of who will exercise
the incompetent patient's constitutional right to refuse treatment, we must recognize the importance
of the family .... The right of the parent to speak for the minor child is ... embedded in our
tradition and common law ... ."); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 636-37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) ("It
is well established that parents speak for their minor children in matters of medical treatment....
Because medical treatment includes the decision to decline lifesaving intervention, it follows that
parents are empowered to make decisions regarding withdrawal or wilholding of lifesaving or life-
prolonging measures on behalf of their children." (citation omitted)).
199. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1056, 1063 (Mass. 1978) (ordering
chemotherapy for a minor child when the treatment offered a "chance for a cure and a normal life,
there was no alternative treatment, and the child would die without the treatment); Application of
Cicero, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966-68 (1979) (ordering corrective surgery for an infant's spinal disorder
when the infant would die without the treatment but would have moderate handicaps with the
treatment). In a unique 1993 case, a Virginia court strongly affirmed parental rights but also relied
upon a child's "constitutional right to life" in ruling that a hospital could not refuse a mother's request
for continued ventilator treatment for an infant with anencephaly. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022,
1028 (E.D. Va. 1993).
200. E.g., Carl. E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REV. 151,
157-58.
201. Id. Schneider also argues that the basis of parental rights is tenuous and that a focus on
parental rights influences parents to place their own concerns first. Id. at 158-64.
202. FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 214.
203. E.g., Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 22, at 1931; Stevenson et al., supra note 14, at 1911.
Ethical guidelines on the termination of life-sustaining treatment developed by the Society of Critical
Care Medicine explain that "[t]he unique interdependence between the child and family justifies the
family's participation in treatment-related decisions. Within the family unit, there is a strong
presumption in favor of parents as primary decision-makers for their children." Task Force on Ethics
of the Society of Critical Care Medicine, supra note 134, at 1438.
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advisability of giving parents the primary role in decisions to withhold or
withdraw care from infants.2 4 However, commentators have argued for
limits to parental discretion.2' Emotional distress at the premature birth
of a child may be overwhelming, and parental ability to make sound deci-
sions may initially be impaired.2°6 Fear of raising an impaired child may
influence decisions,207 as may individual biases of parents about such chil-
dren.2 °3 Finally, some parents may harbor "'idiosyncratic"' views such as




these factors may interfere with a parent's ability to determine a child's
best interests.2 1
B. PHYSICIANS
Physicians may have biases of their own which may interfere with an
objective best interests analysis in some cases x.2 1  A bias toward nontreat-
ment in marginal cases may cause a physician not to recommend aggres-
sive treatments. 2  On the other hand, some doctors may have a bias
toward aggressive treatment for a number of reasons.213 As one observer
of an NICU relates, "[m]any of the sickest babies in the nursery appeal to
the doctors' self-image as crisis managers. "24 Doctors also may favor
aggressive treatment in order to obtain research funding, practice treat-
ment techniques, or instruct junior physicians.2 15 They may wish to fur-
ther the reputation of the hospital as a research center or a facility with
high survival statistics for very premature infants.216 They also may be
influenced by personal moral judgments.21 In some cases, doctors may
204. E.g., In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984); In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (II.
App. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E. 3d 1264 (11. 1993). See supra notes 196-198 (discussing cases
in which courts have implicitly recognized the advisability of parental decision-making in upholding
parental decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment).
205. E.g., Newman, supra note 63, at 51.
206. Developments, supra note 44, at 1608.
207. Id.
208. Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 835.
209. Newman, supra note 63, at 51 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 218 (1983)).
210. See, e.g., Task Force on Ethics of the Society of Critical Care Medicine, supra note 134, at
1438 ("Parents... must demonstrate the ability to understand the facts of their child's condition and
prognosis and be able to put the child's best interest above other considerations.").
211. E.g., FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 48-49.
212. See id. (relating one doctor's description of omissions in treatment to hasten death in cases
with a poor prognosis).
213. E.g., FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 56.
214. Id.
215. Newman, supra note 63, at 51.
216. Id. See also Bedrick, supra note 32, at 282 ("We read articles in which intensive care
nurseries proclaim with pride the weight and gestational age of the smallest baby they have had
survive in their units.")
217. Newman, supra note 63, at 51.
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cross the fine line between conventional and experimental treatments.2 18
Whether a doctor provides less aggressive or more aggressive treatment,
problems can arise in communication with parents.219 The physician usu-
ally has an authoritative position vis-a-vis the parents in discussions of
treatment options and may present options with a slanted view. 2 0 Com-
munication also may be less effective if doctors are uncertain about the
medical situation or if they do not provide parents with enough informa-
tion because of delicacy, time constraints, or a lack of appreciation of the
wide gap between the parents' understanding and their own. 22 In such
cases, parental consent may not be truly informed.' One physician illus-
trates these problems in describing an experience that occurred with a
premature infant with whom he had tried experimental procedures:
The baby was presented at grand rounds as a triumph of mecha-
nism-guided treatment, and I was made to feel like a hero. My
rescue fantasy was fulfilled.
I was very disappointed that the parents did not share these
joyous feelings of high adventure.... They were completely
overwhelmed by what I was doing to prolong the life of this...
baby. I tried to focus their attention on the miraculous present,
and I was annoyed that their thoughts were fixed on an uncer-
tain future. They kept asking about long-term outlook. I was
forced to admit I had no idea about prognosis because few, if
any, infants of this size ever survived....
218. See id., at 33-37 (explaining the difficulty of distinguishing between experimental treatment
and conventional treatment). Newman states:
When medical hypotheses are rigorously tested, presented in the professional
literature and subject to widespread scrutiny and criticism, truly worthy techniques pass
from the domain of research to the domain of accepted conventional therapy. The
precise moment of passage is impossible to ascertain. Indeed, there is no exact moment,
but a transition time in which a therapeutic idea is more or less accepted, more or less
regarded as useful in certain generally defined situations.
Id. at 34.
219. E.g., FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 160-61.
220. Id. As Frohock explains:
Nowhere is the inequality between parents and doctors more clearly expressed than in
the transmission of information. Most of the time physicians will fairly and lucidly lay out
various options so that parents can make a choice. But when they want parents to select a
particular option, they will present the facts of the case and the proposed therapy in
terms designed to sway the parents. For example, by labeling a therapy as "experimental"
or "untested" or "new and radical,- a doctor can be reasonably sure o a negative
response. If the negative choice is still not forthcoming, the doctor can say that the
therapy is "unknown" or "of marginal benefit" of [sic] has "unpredictable side effects."
On the other hand, if a doctor -describes a therapy as "promising- or -improved" or
"hopeful" or "quite possibly effective," the parents are more likely to select that
treatment.
Id.
221. GusTrArs & YouNc, supra note 3, at 159.
222. Id.
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As I take a long look back at this experience, I see that the
moral judgment of these parents was much more highly devel-
oped than mine.2 a
C. HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMI-rrEES
Many hospitals, particularly tertiary care centers, have developed
internal ethics committees to provide guidance and/or review for difficult
treatment decisions.22 An ethics committee may be made up of physi-
cians, nurses, attorneys, clergy members, medical ethicists, hospital
administrators, and community members.s While few courts have criti-
qued the role of ethics committees in treatment decisions for incompe-
tent patients,22 6 commentators have noted benefits, as well as problems,
with committee involvement.22
On the one hand, ethics committees may provide expedited, flexible,
and objective review in a nonadversarial setting.2 They may promote
consistency in the decision-making process.229 They also may ensure that
community values are incorporated into the process.30 Committees can
provide additional expertise from doctors and nurses not directly involved
with the patient and a forum for full, interdisciplinary discussion of treat-
ment options.231 This may help to counter any individual physician
biases. z 2 Committee involvement may facilitate communication between
the parents and the attending physician, -3 which may lessen the intimi-
dation that parents may feel in dealing with a physician.234 The commit-
tee can ensure that parents are fully informed about the medical facts2-5
and that they are maling a rational decision rather than an emotional
223. William A. Silverman, Overtreatment of Neonates? A Personal Retrospective, 90
PEDIUTRICS 971, 971-72 (1992).
224. E.g., Rebecca A. Havlisch, Treatment Decision-Making in the Neonatal Intensive Care
Unit--Governmental Regulation Compromises Parental Autonomy, 13 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 951,
981-82 (1987).
225. E.g., Developments, supra note 44, at 1612. See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.55(a) & (f) (providing
guidelines for a model Infant Care Review Committee developed by the Department of Health and
Human Services).
226. But see In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668-69 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(suggesting involvement of an ethics committee in treatment decisions primarily to diffuse
responsibility).
227. E.g., Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 849-50.
228. Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1343.
229. Id.
230. Developments, supra note 44, at 1612.
231. Newman, supra note 63, at 55.
232. Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 848.
233. Newman, supra note 63, at 55.
234. GUSTAMS & YOUNC, supra note 3, at 160-61.
235. Id.; Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 848.
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one.2-6 Finally, review and guidance from an ethics committee may pre-
vent judicial involvement." 7
However, commentators also have noted disadvantages and dangers
of ethics committee involvement in treatment decision-making -A A
committee may make unsatisfactory compromises to achieve consensus,
and it may inappropriately diffuse decision-making responsibility. 2 9 Phy-
sicians on the committee may only serve to reinforce biases of the treating
physician,2 ° and members may be motivated by institutional biases.?4 If
a committee with nonphysician members has a great deal of influence
over treatment decisions, it may venture into the unlicensed practice of
medicine.242 In addition, privacy and confidentiality for patients and fam-
ilies may be jeopardized if nonmedical and even noninstitutional commit-
tee members learn the details of each case? 3
Some of these potential dangers may be avoided by making commit-
tee review optional and subject to parental consent. 2  Legal limitations
on committee authority and a guarantee of parental access to committee
records may be advisable.24 Commentators also have argued that ethics
committees should "work from clearly articulated principles and guide-
lines." 6 In addition, committees may benefit from the membership of
parents of handicapped children who can provide a perspective on the
results of treatment decisions."4
D. JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
Commentators have noted that routine judicial involvement may be
ill-suited to treatment decisions for premature infants for several rea-
sons.2,48 First, the courts are not able to respond quickly enough or
knowledgeably enough to these unique, complex, and rapidly-changing
medical situations. 49 Furthermore, litigation may involve additional
236. Newman, supra note 63, at 55.
237. Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 849. For a discussion of the merits of judicial
involvement, see infra part IV.D.
238. E.g., Newman, supra note 63, at 55-56.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Developments, supra note 44, at 1612 (explaining that members may fear institutional
liability or costs).
242. Newman, supra note 63, at.56; Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 850.
243. Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 850.
244. Id.; Robert M. Kliegman et al., In Our Best Interests: Experience and Workings of an
Ethics Review Committee, 108 J. PEDIAmICS 178, 182-183 (1986).
245. Developments, supra note 44, at 1612-13.
246. Rhoden, supra note 82, at 1343. See also Kliegman et al., supra note 244, at 179-82
(describing operative principles of a working ethics committee).
247. Kliegman et al., supra note 244, at 186.
248. E.g., Newman, supra note 63, at 57.
249. d See also FROHOCK, supra note 13, at 124 ("[Tlhe logic of law . . . [involves]
disinterestedness, adversarial proceedings, conclusive decisions, objective interests, and even rights.
It is not easy to see how a legal hearing can remain consistent with the special commitments,
[Vol. 70:129
1994) NoTE
stress for parents and physicians alike and may sacrifice family privacy. 25
The cost of counsel often will be prohibitive for parents who already face
huge medical bills.25' Finally, one commentator has argued that requir-
ig judicial approval only for nontreatment decisions sends parents the
message that consenting to aggressive treatment is the path of least
resistance. 
2
Several courts have agreed that routine judicial oversight of decisions
to withhold or withdraw treatment from incompetent persons would be
inappropriate. z3  However, these decisions indicated that courts
remained open to hear such cases if needed.- 4 Other courts have agreed
that judicial involvement is not necessary in all cases but have carefully
limited that policy.= Finally, some courts have expressed a judicial pref-
erence for court approval in all cases of withdrawal of treatment from
incompetent persons.256
consultative and cooperative actions, serial and tentative decisions, and particularized interests of
neonatology.-).
250. Newman, supra note 63, at 57.
251. Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 196, at 849.
252. Newman, supra note 63, at 58-59.
253. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Rosebush,
491 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983).
254. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669; Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 637; Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
255. See In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 723, 723 (Ga. 1984) (confining a decision that judicial
oversight was unnecessary to cases involving withdrawal of "death-prolonginge treatment and
specifically leaving open the question of whether judicial approval was required for withdrawal of
"ife-prolonging" treatment); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378-79 (Wash. 1984)
(limiting this policy to cases in which the patient was in a persistent vegetative state and being
maintained by life support machines and specifying that any party involved could obtain judicial
intervention); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that
courts must be available to hear such cases "whe[n] doubt exists, or there is a lack of concurrence
among the family, physicians, and the hospital, or if an affected party simply desires a judicial order").
256. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass.
1976). The Saikewicz court reasoned that "such questions of life and death seem to us to require the
process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the
judicial branch of government was created" and stated that "[w]e take a dim view of any attempt to
shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly established courts . . . to any
committee, panel or group .... " Id. at 434-35. This view was more recently expressed by three
judges on the Minnesota Supreme Court who concurred in a decision to remove life-supprt systems
from an incompetent adult but specifically disagreed with the majority opinion that judicial review
was not required in such cases. In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984)
(Kelley, J., Yetka, J., and Peterson, J., concurring specially).
The majority stated in a footnote: At oral argument it was disclosed that on an average
about 10 life support systems are disconnected weekly in Minnesota. This follows
consultation between the attending doctor and the family with the approval of the
hospital ethics committee. It is not intended by this opinion that a court order is required
in such situations.
Id. at n.4. Nevertheless, the concurring justices rejected this statement, and Justice Kelley stated, "I
am of the view that in all cases when the decision of continued life or likely death is involved there
should be a court procedure similar to the procedure followed in this case." Id. at 341.
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E. GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT
Federal involvement in medical decision-making for infants has been
criticized for practical reasons. ss Congress and federal agencies are
prone to compromise and to pressure from special interests. 25  Also,
Congress and federal agencies are ill-equipped to mandate narrow poli-
cies in such a complex and uncertain area of medicine. 5 9 Federal poli-
cies may threaten state constitutional protections as well. 2
State governmental involvement may be criticized for some of the
same reasons, but some commentators have suggested that state statutes
which specifically address withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment
from minors and infants would be helpful.2 6' The child abuse and neglect
statutes of most states may be inapplicable to such situations or may not
deal with them adequately.2 62 On the other hand, statutes which deal
with withdrawal of care from adults may not take into account the roles of
the child and its parents.2 3 Courts in recent years have requested state
legislatures to take action in this area.26
V. CONCLUSION
Should the infant in our hypothetical case receive surgery? Should
his ventilator treatment be continued, and if so, for how long? In making
these decisions, all parties involved should focus upon the best interests of
the infant. The best interests standard is more useful than a nondiscrimi-
nation approach, which would fail to recognize that this infant's disabili-
ties are inseparable from his life-threatening medical problems.2e The
best interests standard is also more useful than a substituted judgment
approach, which is not logically applicable to any patient who has never
been competent. 266 To ascertain the infant's best interests, the benefits of
treatment should be weighed against the probable burdens.26s This bal-
ancing test necessarily involves quality of life considerations because ben-
257. E.g., Havlisch, supra note 224, at 978.
258. IXr
259. Id.
260. Newman, supra note 63, at 15-24.
261. E.g., Developments, supra note 44, at 1609-11.
262. See Newman, supra note 63, at 13-15 (explaining that a parental decision to withdraw care
based upon the child's best interests cannot be characterized as neglect).
263. Lisa Hawkins, Living-Will Statutes: A Minor Oversight, 78 VA. L. Rxv. 1581, 1584-85
(1992).
264. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985) (explaining that l[als an elected
body, the Legislature is better able than any other single institution to reflect the social values at
stake" and that -[i]n addition, it has the resources and ability to synthesize vast quantities of data and
opinions from a variety of fields and to formulate general guidelines').
265. Supra note 59 and part III.A.
266. Supra part III.C.
267. Supra part III.D.
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efits and burdens are defined qualitatively from the infant's
perspective.2
In our hypothetical case, the infant's mother wants surgery withheld
and ventilator treatment withdrawn. As a parent presumed to act in her
child's best interests, she should have a primary role in making such deci-
sions. 6 9 However, the mother's discretion should not be unchecked.
Doctors should ensure that she is making informed and rational decisions
based upon the child's best interests in light of the medical prognosis, and
not based upon fear or bewilderment.270 On the other hand, the doctors'
discretion should also be checked.2 7 1 A hospital ethics committee should
ensure that the doctors, too, are motivated by the child's best interests. If
the doctors agree with the mother that treatment should be withdrawn or
withheld, the ethics committee should perform this checking function
merely by reviewing the medical facts and determining whether the deci-
sion to withhold or withdraw treatment is reasonable in light of those
facts. If doctors disagree with the mother or among themselves, the eth-
ics committee should play the role of a mediator, taking a more active role
to facilitate communication between the parties and to ensure that all
parties are using appropriate decision-making standards. 2 2 If this pro-
cess works, judicial intervention should not be necessary. 3 If the court
must get involved, then it, like the ethics committee, should first act as a
mediator. If the court must decide whether treatment should be with-
drawn or withheld, then it, too, should employ the best interests standard
and weigh the benefits of treatment against the burdens.
Following these guidelines will not produce an ideal result for this
infant or for his mother. The most that can be hoped for is that the
mother and the doctors will make informed treatment decisions in light of
the infant's best interests. This standard may at least prevent withdrawal
of treatment too hastily. It may also prevent continuation of treatment for
too long.
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